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Abstract—We propose a novel ECA approach to manage
changes in IaaS performance signatures. The proposed ap-
proach relies on the detection of anomalous performance
behavior in the context of IaaS performance signatures. A novel
anomaly-based event detection technique is proposed. It utilizes
the experience of free trial users to detect potential changes
in IaaS performance signatures. A signature change detection
technique is proposed using the cumulative sum control chart
analysis. Additionally, a self-adjustment method is introduced
to improve the accuracy of the proposed approach. A set of
experiments based on real-world datasets are conducted to
show the effectiveness of the proposed approach.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Infrastructure-as-a-Service (IaaS) is a key service deliv-
ery model in the cloud market [1]. Various computational
resources such as CPU, memory, and storage are offered
through IaaS models in the form of Virtual Machines (VMs).
IaaS cloud enables an easier, faster, and cost-effective way
to migrate and manage an organization’s in-house IT in-
frastructure in the cloud [2]. Large business organizations
typically prefer to utilize IaaS services on a long-term basis
[3]. Most IaaS providers offer significant discounts on long-
term subscriptions (e.g., 1 to 3 years) in the cloud market.
For example, Microsoft Azure offers up to 72% discounts
on long-term subscriptions1.
The selection of IaaS services for a long-term period is an
important business decision for many organizations due to
economic reasons [1]. The performance of IaaS services is a
major concern during the long-term selection [4]. Selecting
a service that may perform poorly in the future, may lead to
an inevitable loss of productivity for an organization. The
performance of an IaaS service is typically measured in
terms of Quality of Services (QoS) attributes such as CPU
execution time, disk read/write throughput, and latency. QoS
attributes help a consumer to determine the best performing
services from a large number of functionally similar services
[5]. The long-term QoS-aware service selection is therefore
defined as the similarity matching between the consumer’s
long-term QoS requirements and the expected long-term
performance of IaaS services [3].
The knowledge of the IaaS services’ performance is
paramount in determining which ones are the best fit for the
consumers’ required QoS [2]. Despite that, IaaS providers
typically reveal very limited performance information in
their advertisements due to market competition and business
secrecy [5]. For instance, most IaaS advertisements do not
contain information about actual vCPU (virtual CPU) speed,
1https://azure.microsoft.com/en-au/reservations/
memory bandwidth, or VM startup time. The performance of
a VM may change over time given the dynamic nature of the
cloud environment [2]. As a result, advertised performance
information may not reflect the actual performance of a
service for a particular provisioning time. For example, a
consumer may want to utilize some VMs in December
where the advertised performance is measured in June.
In such a case, the advertised information is not useful
for the selection in December. Additionally, the advertised
performance information may not be helpful to understand a
service’s performance due to the lack of detailed information
[5]. For instance, Amazon EC2 instances have different types
of virtual CPUs (vCPUs). According to the EC2 advertise-
ments, each vCPU is either a thread of an Intel Xeon core
or AWS Graviton processor2. Estimating the performance
of the vCPU from such incomplete information is difficult.
Therefore, the lack of detailed and complete performance
information makes the long-term selection challenging [3].
Effective utilization of free trials offered by IaaS providers
is a unique way to deal with the limited performance
information for the long-term selection [6]. A long-term IaaS
selection framework is proposed in [3]. It leverages short-
term trials to discover the unknown performance information
of an IaaS service [3]. The framework introduces an equiv-
alence partitioning-based strategy that maps a consumer’s
long-term workloads into the free short-term trial periods to
discover long-term performance. However, free trial experi-
ences do not provide adequate information to make the best
service selection for a long-term period. The key reason is
that the performance of IaaS services changes periodically
due to the multi-tenant nature of the cloud [2]. The observed
performance in a trial in one month may change if the trial
is performed in a different month. Therefore, making a long-
term commitment based on only short trials does not always
lead to the best service selection [3].
IaaS performance signatures offer an effective alternative
to deal with the unknown service performance variability
for the long-term selection [7], [8]. An IaaS performance
signature represents the expected performance of an IaaS
service over a long period of time. For instance, a signature
of a VM may indicate that its response time is expected
to increase by 10% on January than the response time in
December. A consumer’s trial experience of a service and
its corresponding signature can be utilized together to make
a better selection for the long-term period. A signature-
based IaaS selection approach is proposed in [8]. The
proposed approach generates signatures using the experience
2https://aws.amazon.com/ec2/instance-types/
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of past trial users. However, the proposed approach does not
consider the dynamic nature of performance signatures.
IaaS performance signatures are dynamic in nature and
may need to be re-evaluated over a long period of time for a
number of reasons [7]. For instance, a provider may upgrade
its infrastructure or change its multi-tenant management pol-
icy resulting in change of service performance [9]. In such a
case, it is important to detect the change of IaaS performance
as early as possible to make sure the signature reflects the
current performance behavior of the service. We focus on the
detection of change in IaaS performance as represented by
its signature. In this case, the IaaS performance signature
may need to be updated to be representative of the new
performance profile of the service. We propose a novel
Event-Condition-Action (ECA) approach to mange changes
in IaaS performance signatures. The ECA model is a simple
yet powerful tool that has been extensively used in databases,
cognitive computing, and semantic web. In the ECA model,
when an event is detected, a condition is checked, and a
resulting action is executed [10].
We identify two key challenges in IaaS performance
signature change detection. The first challenge is determin-
ing the threshold which would trigger testing whether the
present signature needs to be re-evaluated [11]. Certain
changes in performance of a service may not necessitate
a change in its signature. For instance, a major failure of
computing infrastructure may negatively impact the per-
formance of an IaaS service at a point in time without
necessarily indicating a long term change in the performance
behavior. Therefore, the challenge is to accurately identify
situations where there is a high likelihood of long-term
changes in performance, thus requiring a re-evaluation of the
signature. The second challenge is ascertaining whether the
re-evaluation of the signature was warranted. As predicting
whether a change of performance warrants a re-evaluation
of the signature, is probabilistic in nature, there is a need
to ascertain that it was the correct course of action. The
challenge is to identify factors that would evaluate the
accuracy of that re-evaluation.
We propose a set of techniques that rely on the de-
tection of anomalous performance behavior in the context
of IaaS performance signatures. In particular, the proposed
approach consists of two main parts: a) an anomaly-based
event detection technique that determines when to trig-
ger the re-evaluation of a signature, and b) a signature
change detection method that leverages existing time se-
ries change detection techniques to re-evaluate the present
IaaS performance signatures. In addition, we introduce a
self-adjustment method to improve the performance of the
proposed ECA approach using a feedback loop from the
outcome of the signature change detection. In summary,
we propose a novel framework for the detection of accu-
rate changes in IaaS performance signatures. Accuracy is
achieved over time through continuous testing of the re-
evaluated signatures which may lead to either (1) confirming
the previous signature changes, or (2) invalidating the pre-
vious signature changes.
II. IAAS PERFORMANCE SIGNATURE
We discuss how to represent the performance signature
of an IaaS service in this section. The word “signature”
typically refers to the unique characteristics or behavior
of an object, entity, or piece of information. The concept
of the signature has been widely utilized in a number of
domains such as cryptography, security, computing, and
mathematics. For instance, signatures of various application
performance are utilized for resource capacity planning and
performance anomaly detection in [7]. Antivirus software
leverages signature-based malware detection techniques to
enable quick detection of security threats. Digital signatures
are commonly used to verify the authenticity and integrity of
digital messages or documents. A checksum is also a form
signature that is utilized to verify data integrity. Checksums
are usually represented by a small-sized datum derived from
block data to detect errors in data transmission.
We represent the signature of an IaaS service based on
its relative performance changes over time, i.e., how much
a service’s performance may increase or decrease in one
time compared to another time. For example, the signature
of a VM may inform that its response time is expected to
increase by 5% on weekend nights than regular weekdays.
Note that, the signature does not tell the exact performance
of a service. Therefore, a consumer is unable to select a
service based on only its signature. Instead, the consumer
needs to perform the trial with its application workloads and
utilize the trial experience and its performance signature to
estimate the provider’s long-term performance [8].
Definition 1. IaaS Performance Signature: An IaaS per-
formance signature is a temporal representation of relative
performance changes of an IaaS service over a long period.
The signature is represented by a set of QoS parameters
that are relevant to the service. The relevant QoS attributes
are defined by the most important QoS attributes to measure
the performance of a particular type of IaaS service [12]. For
example, data read/write throughput, and disk latency are the
key QoS attributes for virtual storage services.
We denote the signature of a service as S =
{S1, S2, ...Sn}, where n is the number of QoS attributes
in the signature. Each Si corresponds to a QoS attribute.
Each Si denotes a time series for t period and represented as
Si = {si1, si2, ......sit}. Here, sit is the relative performance
of the provider at the time t for a particular QoS attribute.
We use the following representation to denote a signature:
S =

s11 s12 .. s1t
s21 s22 .. s2t
s31 s13 .. s3t
.. .. ...
sn1 sn2 .. snt
 (1)
where each row corresponds to the QoS signature of
Qi and each column represents a timestamp t. From the
equation 1, we see that a signature may include several
QoS attributes. However, we focus only one QoS attribute in
this work, i.e., throughput of an IaaS service for simplicity.
As a result, the signature in this work is considered two-
dimensional. We may extend this work in future to support
more than two dimension of IaaS performance signatures.
III. GENERATION OF IAAS PERFORMANCE SIGNATURE
The performance of an IaaS service may change based on
several factors such as co-tenants, resource overbooking, and
poor network conditions [6]. It is difficult to know exactly
what are the factors behind the performance variability over
time from the consumer’s side. Fortunately, the performance
of IaaS services typically exhibits periodic behavior, i.e,
weekly, monthly, or yearly seasonality [2]. Therefore, it is
possible to capture the seasonal performance changes from
the experience of past trial users over different times [6].
It is important to note that, the past trial users may not
want to share their experience publicly to protect their pri-
vacy, security, and the conflict of interests with the provider
[13]. However, they may share their trial experience with a
Trusted Non-Profit Organization (TNPO) for a limited period
to help new consumers in the selection [14]. Examples of
such TNPOs are available in public sectors where privacy-
sensitive information about individuals needs to be shared
to deliver better services. For instance, health research insti-
tutes often collect data about individual patients to improve
health services. TNPOs are responsible for data integration
and distribution of collective knowledge without revealing
individual’s privacy-sensitive information.
We assume that the past trial users who have utilized
some IaaS services share their experience with a TNPO for a
limited period of time in this work. The TNPO generates IaaS
performance signatures based on the aggregated experience
of past trial users and deletes the users’ data afterward. Let
us assume that there are three IaaS providers (A, B, and
C) who offer three VMs (VMa, VMb, and VMc) with
similar configurations (e.g., resource capacity, location) for
free short-term trials as shown in Figure 1. There exist past
users who utilized the trials to find the performance of each
VM over different periods of time. The trial users do not
Past	Trial	Users
Trusted	Non-profit	
Organization
Signature
Generation
VMa
Provider	A
Provider	B
Provider	C
VMb
VMc
Signature	A
Signature	B
Signature	C
Performance
Monitoring
Free
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Figure 1: IaaS performance signature generation
want to share their trial experience publicly. However, each
trial user shares its experience with a TNPO for a short
period. The TNPO generates signatures to identify the long-
term performance variability of each VM. The TNPO has to
delete users’ experience once the signatures are computed. A
signature provides an aggregated view of a VM’s long-term
performance variability. It is not possible to derive individual
trial experience from the signature. As a result, the TNPO
does not violate the privacy of past trial users.
We create IaaS performance signatures in a way that
requires less detailed performance information about the
service performance and the past trial users and yet use-
ful enough to make a long-term selection. We apply a
normalized averaging method [3] to generate the signature
based on the experience of past trial users. Let us assume
that k number of past trial users share their observed trial
performance Qk over the period T for a service. Here, Qk
refers to the performance observed by the kth consumer for
the QoS attribute Q over the period T . We denote Qk as
Qk = {q1k, q2k, .., qtk}. The following steps are performed
to generate the signature for the QoS attribute Q:
1) For a QoS attribute Q, the performance observed by the
trial users is collected over time T .
2) At each timestamp t ∈ T , the average performance
observed by k number of consumers is measured for Q.
The average performance is denoted by Qk.
3) Each Qk is normalized based on its standard deviation
σ(Qk). The normalized QoS time series is considered as
the IaaS performance signature S over the period T .
The value of snt at any t represents the relative QoS
performance compare to any other time t′ in Equation 1.
This representation of the signature offers two benefits. First,
the use of signature becomes easier once a consumer has
utilized free trials based on its workloads. The performance
for any other time can be found by comparing the ratio
between the trial month and other times. Second, signatures
can be stored and updated easily over time as it does not
require storing detailed information. The signature mainly
reflects substantial changes in the performance over a long
period. The effect of the signature should be visible by most
consumers in the trial period unless the provider utilizes an
isolated environment.
IV. THE PROPOSED ECA APPROACH
We apply an ECA approach to manage changes in IaaS
performance signatures. The ECA model is especially useful
when an action needs to be performed based on a condition
that needs to be satisfied. According to the ECA model, an
event determines when to trigger an action, the condition
defines how to evaluate the event, and the action sets
the execution plan in response to the event. An event is
typically a special indicator that informs a system that an
action may need to be performed. An example of events in
security software could be defined as the deletion of a large
number of files at once. The security software may start the
evaluation of the event, i.e., the deletion of a large number
of files to find out whether it is a result of a security attack
or a user action.
Anomalous performance behavior is a potential indicator
of IaaS performance change [7]. An anomalous performance
behavior is the deviation from the expected performance of
an IaaS service. The expected performance is represented
by its performance signature. Performance anomalies are
typically common in the cloud environment [15]. Anomalies
may occur due to unexpected events faced by the IaaS
provider such as a sudden increase in the workload of the
physical system, power failure, or natural disasters. As a
result, experiencing performance anomalies in the free trial
period may be normal in the cloud. However, the frequent
occurrence of performance anomalies in the free trial period
may indicate changes in IaaS performance, thus requiring
a re-evaluation of the existing signature. [7]. Therefore, we
define the event for the IaaS performance change detection
based on the frequent occurrence of performance anomalies.
Definition 2. Event: An event is the frequent occurrence of
performance anomalies that are experienced by the free trial
users within a fixed period of time.
The frequency is initially defined as an arbitrary number
or threshold f which can be adjusted in the self-adjustment
step. Once an event is detected, it needs to be evaluated to
detect whether the signature has been changed. If the event
satisfies the condition, the signature needs to be updated.
The condition and action are defined as follows:
Definition 3. Condition: The condition is the process of
testing an event to ascertain changes in IaaS performance.
Definition 4. Action: The action is the process of updating
the present IaaS performance signature to reflect the changes
in the IaaS performance.
We utilize the above three definitions as the basis for
the proposed ECA approach. In the following sections, we
describe the three parts of the proposed approach: a) an
anomaly-based event detection, b) a signature change detec-
tion and signature update (condition and action respectively),
and c) a self-adjustment method to improve the accuracy of
the proposed approach.
V. ANOMALY-BASED EVENT DETECTION
We utilize the free trial experience and the existing IaaS
performance signatures to detect performance anomalies.
The events are detected based on the performance anomalies.
First, we measure the similarity between the trial experience
of a consumer and the signatures to detect performance
anomalies [15]. When a user’s trial experience is similar
to the current signature, the signature is considered to be
representative of the expected service performance. When
the trial experience does not exhibit similar performance
behavior as represented by its signature, we consider it as an
anomalous performance behavior. The signature represents
the relative performance behavior as a time series. As a
result, the shape of the time series needs to be considered
to measure the similarity rather than the value of each
data point in the signature time series. There are numerous
approaches in the existing literature to measure time series
similarity based on the shape such as Pearson Correlation
Coefficients (PCC), Euclidean Distance (ED), Spearman
Correlation (SC), Cosine Similarity (CS), Symbolic Aggre-
gate Approximation (SAX), and Dynamic Time Warping
(DTW). Each of these methods may be applied to measure
the similarity between the trial experience and the signatures.
We briefly discuss how to apply the PCC, CC, and ED for
the similarity measure to detect performance anomalies in
the context of IaaS performance signatures.
Let us denote the trial experience of a user by EQ where
EQ denotes the performance of an IaaS services in the free
trial period Tf . Here, Tf << T , i.e., the free trial period
is significantly less than the required provisioning time T .
We represents EQ as a time series EQ = {q1, q2, ...qn}
where n is the number of timestamps in t. EQ needs to
be normalized before measuring the similarity with an IaaS
performance signature. Let E′Q is the normalized trial per-
formance where the normalization is performed based on its
standard deviation. We denote E′Q as E
′
Q = {q′1, q′2, ...q′n}.
Let the signature of an IaaS service for the trial period Tf is
SQ for the QoS attribute Q where SQ = {s1, s2, s3, ...sn}.
The similarity between the normalized trial experience (E′Q)
and the signature of a service during the trial period (SQ)
using the Euclidean distance (S(E′Q, SQ)
ED) is computed
by the following equation:
S(E′Q, SQ)
ED =
√√√√ n∑
t=1
(st − q′t) (2)
Similarly, the similarity measure using the Pearson Corre-
lation Coefficients is computed using the following equation:
S(ENQ , SQ)
PCC =
∑n
t=1(st − s¯)(q′t − q¯′)√
(st − s¯)2
√
(q′t − q¯)2
(3)
where q¯′ and s¯ is the mean value of q′ and s within the
trial period Tf . The cosine similarity of the trial experience
is measured by the following equation:
S(ENQ , SQ)
CS = cos θ =
∑n
t=1 stq
′
t√∑n
t=1(si)
2
√∑n
t=1(q
′)2i
(4)
Each of the above equations provides us with a similarity
value between the trial experience and the corresponding
IaaS performance signature. In the case of the euclidean
distance, the lower the distance is the higher the similarity.
A similarity threshold needs to be defined to determine
how much deviation of the performance from the signature
should be considered as the performance anomaly. We define
a similarity threshold Sthresh for each technique. The thresh-
old is used to distinguish between the normal performance
behavior and performance anomalies. The initial threshold is
defined during the signature generation process based on the
experience of the past trial users’ experience. Let us assume
that there are N number of past trial users. The experience
of the past trial users is denoted by EP = {E1, E2, ...EN}.
The initial similarity threshold TS for anomaly detection is
defined as follows:
TS =
N
min
i=1
S(Ei, SQ)
M (5)
where M denotes the similarity measure method, i.e.,
PCC, ED, or CS. The threshold for different similarity mea-
sure technique can be different. When a new user performs
trial if the user’s observed performance has a similarity
lower than the TS , we consider it as anomalous performance
behavior of the service. The value of the similarity threshold
Sthresh is adjusted based on the experiments.
The event for signature change detection is defined as
the frequent occurrence of performance anomalies within
a fixed period of time as mentioned earlier. Therefore, we
define an anomaly threshold for the event detection and
denote as Fthresh which represents the minimum number
of occurrence of the performance anomalies within a period
of time Tf . The value of Tf is the length of the free
trial period. We assume that each provider offers the same
length of free trial without the loss of generality. The value
of Fthresh can be initially defined as the number of past
trial users within each Tf period who have the minimum
similarity between their experience and the corresponding
signature. For example, if there are 5 past trial users who
have the minimum similarity TS with the present signature,
then Fthresh is initialized as 5. In such a case, the number
of past trial users that have the minimum similarity during
the signature generation process is considered as the usual
number of performance anomalies within Tf period. When
the number of performance anomalies crosses Fthresh, we
consider it as an event that needs to be evaluated for the
signature change detection. We update the value of Fthresh
over time to detect the signature change effectively in the
self-adjustment step based on the experiments.
VI. SIGNATURE CHANGE DETECTION
An event indicates that a signature may need to be re-
evaluated. When an event is detected, the present signature
needs to be tested to evaluate the event. This testing is the
condition part of the proposed ECA approach. The main
concern in the signature change detection is to differenti-
ate between the performance anomalies and performance
changes. This is similar to the signature processing domain,
where the noise is a major concern for signal change
detection. For instance, a voice recognition program has to
differentiate between the noises in the environment and the
voice of new persons. There exist a number of approaches
for change detection in a signal or time series based on
supervised, semi-supervised, or unsupervised methods [16].
We choose an unsupervised method called CUSUM which
is a sequential analysis technique for small change detection
in a time series. The CUSUM control chart is a simple
and effective technique that is used in several areas such as
signal processing, image processing, and intrusion detection
in computer networks and security systems [11].
A CUSUM control chart monitors the deviation of the
individual or a group of samples from a target mean. Let us
assume that the observation of a process P has the following
sequence x1, x2, ...xn with an estimated average of mx and
standard deviation sx. The upper limit and the lower limit
of the cumulative sum is defined by the following equations:
ULi =
{
max (0, ULi−1 + xi −mx − 12nsx), i ≥ 1
0, i = 1
(6)
LLi =
{
min (0, LLi−1 + xi −mx + 12nsx), i ≥ 1
0, i = 1
(7)
where ULi is the upper limit, LLi is the lower limit, n
is the minimum detectable shift from the target mean. The
process P is considered in violation of CUSUM criteria at
the sample xi if it obeys ULi > csx or LLi < −csx where
c represents the control limit. The value c is adjustable and
represents the number of standard deviations that the upper
and lower cumulative sums are allowed to drift from the
target mean.
Once an event is detected within a period of time Tf ,
we recompute a new signature (SN ) based on the trial
experience of all the users within that period of time using
the signature generation technique described in section III.
The CUSUM control chart is applied to the new signature
based on the equation 6 and 7. The target mean mx and the
standard deviation sx is set based on the existing signature
S within Tf period. The value of c and n is set based on the
standard practice of CUSUM that is sx and 5sx respectively.
Once we detect the change in the IaaS performance signature
within a time window of Tf , the existing part of the signature
is replaced by the new signature.
VII. SELF-ADJUSTMENT OF THE ECA APPROACH
When an event is detected and evaluated based on the
proposed signature change detection technique, the outcome
will be either a true positive or false positive. A true positive
implies that the signature needs to be updated. A false posi-
tive indicates that the signature does not need to be updated.
The number of false positives can be reduced by adjusting
Anomaly-based
Event	Detection
Condition:
Signature	Change
Detection
Action:	
Signature
Update
Feedback	Loop
True
Positive
False
Positive
Figure 2: Self-adjustment of The ECA approach
the similarity threshold Sthresh for the anomaly detection
and the anomaly threshold Fthresh for the event detection.
For example, let us assume that the anomaly threshold for
the event detection is set to 5 performance anomalies for
a one-month trial period. If the TNPO detects 5 anomalies
in every month and the outcome is a true positive, then the
anomaly threshold should have been reduced earlier to detect
the change in IaaS performance. Similarly, if the outcome is
false positive every time, we need to increase the anomaly
threshold for event detection. We apply a self-adjustment
method using a feedback loop from the outcome of the
signature change detection to the event detection to change
the anomaly threshold.
Figure 2 shows the proposed self-adjustment method us-
ing a feedback loop. The outcome of the condition checking
is fed to the anomaly-based event detection module. When
the number of true positives or false positives within a pre-
defined period of time T ′ exceeds a predefined threshold Z,
the event detection module updates the frequency threshold
Fthresh. The value of Z and T ′ is set by the TNPO. The
frequency threshold is updated linearly based on the change
detection outcome. when the outcome of signature change
detection exceeds the true positive threshold then Fthresh
is incremented by one. If the outcome exceeds the false
positive threshold, then Fthresh is decremented by one.
VIII. EXPERIMENTS AND RESULTS
A series of experiments are conducted to evaluate the
proposed ECA approach. We identify two key attributes: a)
the number of false positives, and b) the change detection
delay to evaluate the proposed approach.
A. Experiment Setup
Finding real-world workload traces and performance
datasets for a long-term period is very challenging. Thus,
we utilize the publicly available workload traces and per-
formance data to mimic the long-term cloud environment.
We use the Eucalyptus IaaS workload to generate the trial
workloads of different consumers 3. It contains 6 workload
traces of a production cloud environment. We select a trace
that contains 34 days of workloads of a large company
with 50,000 to 100,000 employees. We partition the data
into 360 parts and consider each partition as an average
3https://www.cs.ucsb.edu/ rich/workload/
Table I: Experiment Variables
Variable Name Values
Total number of simulation 100
Total provisioning period 360 days
Trial length of each consumer 30 days
Total number of IaaS performance signatures 5
Total Number of Consumers 18
Similarity Thresholds 0.1 to 0.9
Anomaly Thresholds 10% to 100%
workload of day to create a 1-year workload data. The long-
term performance of 5 IaaS providers is generated from the
benchmark results published SPEC Cloud IaaS 2016 [3]. We
augment the workload traces with the performance data to
generate a long-term workload-performance dataset of five
IaaS providers. We create the signature of each provider
using the approach in III. The experiment variables are
shown in Table I. We conduct the experiments by changing
the signatures randomly to create new signatures.
B. Evaluation and Discussion
The proposed approach aims at reducing the number
of false positives and the change detection delay varying
the similarity threshold and the anomaly threshold for the
anomaly and event detection respectively. We discuss only
the results of similarity measure using PCC due to the page
limitation. Figure 3(a) shows the number of false positives
that are generated before the actual change detection for the
different values of the similarity thresholds. The anomaly
thresholds are set from 22.22% to 44.44% of the total
number of consumers within a given trial month. The
number of false positives increases with the increase of
similarity thresholds according to Figure 3(a). The reason is
that when the similarity threshold is increased, the number
of detected anomaly increases. As a result, the number of
detected events also increases resulting in a high number of
false positives. The number of false positives directly affects
the delay in signature change detection. The average delay in
change detection is illustrated in Figure 3(b). The average
delay is reduced with the increase of similarity threshold
for anomaly detection. This implies that when the number
of false positives increases, the average detection delay is
reduced due to the increasing number of testing.
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Figure 4: Effects of different anomaly thresholds in change
detection in (a) number of false positives (b) average delay
the result in the opposite way of changing the similar-
ity thresholds. Figure 4(a) and (b) illustrate the effect of
changing the anomaly detection threshold on the number
false positives and the detection delay respectively. The
number of false positives decreases exponentially with the
increase of the anomaly threshold. For instance, when the
anomaly threshold is at 100% of the total consumer, the
number of false positives becomes almost zero. The reason
for such a result is that when the anomaly threshold is
increased, the proposed framework accepts a higher number
of performance anomalies as the normal behavior of the
service. As a result, when the anomaly threshold is 100% of
the total trial users at a point of time, an event is detected
only if every trial user observes anomalous performance
behavior. Similarly, Figure 4(b) depicts that the increase
in the anomaly threshold increases the average detection
delay. The reason is that when the anomaly threshold is
increased, the number of detected events becomes lower.
When the number of events is decreased, the number of
testing of signature is also decreased. This result could
be inferred from the impact of anomaly thresholds on the
number of false positives. Intuitively, if the number of
false positives decreases, the average detection delay should
increase because of the lower number of performed tests.
Figure 3(b) shows that the average change detection delay
varies between 30 to 55 days which is reasonable given the
one month trial period window. Figure 4(b) shows that the
average detection delay varies between 15 to 180 days. The
high value in the result could indicate that the proposed
approach is unable to detect changes in some signatures.
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Figure 5: Minimum delay in change detection for (a) differ-
ent similarity thresholds (b) different anomaly thresholds
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Figure 6: Accuracy of the change detection for (a) different
similarity thresholds (b) different anomaly thresholds
Figure 5 shows that the actual delay for most of the cases
is much lower. Figure 5(a) and (b) shows the minimum
change detection delay for different similarity thresholds
and anomaly thresholds respectively. The value of minimum
change detection varies from 15 days to 60 days in most
cases. The high value of the average change detection delay
indicates that the proposed approach is unable to detect some
of the changes at all. As a result, the average delay in change
detection increases.
If we wait for a long time, the proposed approach may be
able to detect changes in all signature. However, waiting for
an uncertain period to detect the change is unrealistic. We
therefore set a time window Tw. We evaluate the proposed
approach in terms of its ability to detect changes in each
signature within Tw. We set the value of Tw to 60 days based
on the average change detection delay as shown in Fig. 3(b).
If a change in a signature is not detected within the first 60
days of the actual change, we consider that the proposed
approach is unable to detect the change for that particular
signature. Figure 6(a) shows that the detection accuracy in-
creases from 40% to 95% with the increase of the similarity
threshold. This indicates that the proposed approach is able
to detect the change up to 90% of the signatures within the
first 60 days when the similarity threshold is very high. It
is important to note that high accuracy leads to a higher
cost in terms of the number of performed tests. Figure 6(b)
shows that the change detection accuracy decreases from
95% to below 10% with the increase of anomaly threshold
for the event detection. This result is also consistent with
the previous results. The high anomaly threshold leads to
a lower number of testing which results in lower accuracy
in the change detection. The accuracy results indicate that
the similarity threshold and anomaly threshold are needed
to be adjusted separately for each signature to improve the
performance which can be performed using the proposed
self-adjustment method.
IX. RELATED WORK
The performance variability of IaaS services is addressed
in several studies [1], [3], [4], [9]. The performance of IaaS
cloud services is typically estimated for different applica-
tions based on short-trials [3], [6]. However, most of these
approaches do not consider long-term IaaS performance
changes. An extensive study on the variability of IaaS
performance is carried out in [9]. The study suggests that
cloud performance is a “moving target” and requires re-
evaluation periodically. A signature-based selection of IaaS
cloud services is proposed in [8]. The proposed work models
the long-term performance variability of IaaS cloud services
using the concept of signature. The signature of IaaS services
is generated from the experience of the past trial users who
share their data with a trusted third party. The trusted third
party analyzes the periodic performance behavior of an IaaS
service to generate its signature. However, the proposed
work does not consider the changes in the signature over a
long period of time [8]. To the best of our knowledge, there
is no prior work that addresses the detection of performance
changes of IaaS services over a long period of time.
Performance anomaly detection is a well-studied topic
in many domains including cloud computing, distributed
systems, security, and software engineering. Anomaly de-
tection strategies are classified into four major categories in
[15], which are a) signature-based detection, b) observational
detection, c) knowledge-driven detection, and d) flow and
dependency analysis. We decide to choose the signature-
based anomaly detection as it is a natural fit for our work.
Signature-based detection doesn’t require to keep historical
information. As a result, we do not need to keep the record
of the past trial users to detect changes in signatures.
Change detection is an important research topic that
identifies abrupt changes in a process [11]. It has been ap-
plied to many domains including climate change detection,
speech recognition, activity recognition, and edge detection
in image processing. Existing approaches for the change
detection problem are categorized as either “offline” or “on-
line” methods [16]. Offline methods analyze the entire data
set at once and find where the change had occurred. Online
methods for the change detection monitor and analyze each
data point as they become available from a stream or source.
Online methods typically rely on the statistical properties
of the process to determine the change. We identify three
criteria to evaluate change point techniques: a) ability to
detect changes, (b) accurately identifying the change points,
and (c) the number of tests to detect changes. We apply these
three criteria to evaluate the proposed ECA approach.
X. CONCLUSION
We propose a novel ECA approach to detect changes
in IaaS performance which would warrant changes in the
corresponding IaaS signature. The proposed approach relies
on the detection of anomalous performance behavior from
the experience of free trial users to detect changes in
IaaS performance. A novel anomaly-based event detection
technique is proposed to determine when to trigger the re-
evaluation of IaaS signatures. The experiment results show
that the proposed approach is able to accurately detect
changes in IaaS performance that warrant re-evaluation of
the corresponding IaaS signature. Detecting changes in long-
term IaaS performance is important as it will help new
consumers to select the best services according to their long-
term QoS requirements. In future work, we aim to conduct
the experiments on a larger scale to evaluate the impact of
the proposed approach in the long-term selection.
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